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This paper provides an integrated analysis of the structural, relational, and cognitive
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of social capital in the early stages of the lifecycle. However, the level of social capital
in cooperatives exhibits a declining trend along the development of the organization.
The decrease of social capital will lead to an imbalance of the social and economic
attributes of cooperatives. The cooperative’s governance structure must change accord-
ingly. We argue that it is important for cooperatives to maintain and develop the social
capital strategically over time. Otherwise, the comparative advantage of the cooperative
business form may disappear.
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1 Introduction
‘A cooperative is a user-owned and user-controlled business from which benefits are
derived and distributed on the basis of use’ (Dunn 1988). Cooperatives of different
types exist in various sectors, dependent on the identity of users. There are consumer,
worker, producer, and credit cooperatives, etc. These cooperatives have different
features, with some more economic-oriented while others more association like. We
focus on farmer cooperatives, the members of which are farmers having an ownership
and transaction relationship with the cooperative enterprise. Cooperatives play an
important role in the agribusiness because they advance farmers’ economic interests
by bringing them the benefits such as economies of size, elimination of double
marginalization, profits from processing, assurance of product outlet, gains from
vertical and horizontal coordination, risk reduction, countervailing power, competitive
yardstick effects, etc. (e.g. Cook 1995; Liang 2013). Cooperative researchers have
investigated how cooperatives are distinct from other organizational forms in a broad
range of themes (Hendrikse and Feng 2013). To address these topics, various theoret-
ical perspectives are applied, including agency theory (e.g. Cook 1995; Hueth and
Marcoul 2009), transaction costs theory (e.g. Bonus 1986; Hendrikse and Veerman
2001a), property rights theory (e.g. Fulton 1995; Hendrikse and Veerman 2001b),
game theory (e.g. Hendrikse 1998), and bounded cognition theory (e.g. Feng 2011),
etc. However, one common shortcoming of these theoretical approaches is that they
largely ignore the embeddedness of the cooperative’s and members’ economic activ-
ities in the social context of the cooperative’s community. The explanatory relevance of
the social relationships among cooperative members is not taken into consideration.
It is commonly argued that social capital is a valuable asset based on inter-personal
social relationships (e.g. Coleman 1990; Adler and Kwon 2002). Cooperatives are
regarded as ‘social capital-based organizations’ (Valentinov 2004) or as ‘dual organi-
zations’ (Nilsson and Hendrikse 2011). Therefore, social capital is potentially important
in addressing the difference between cooperatives and investor owned firms (IOFs)
because ‘the existence of this social foundation of cooperation, giving rise to its
expressly democratic and people-oriented character, was the basis for differentiating
between the cooperative and “capitalistic” organization’ (Valentinov 2004). Social
capital has been recognized as a main comparative advantage of the cooperative form
(Røkholt 1999; Spear 2000). In addition, cooperatives, compared to other enterprise
forms, have a better ability to foster social capital (Sabatini 2014).
Social capital at the organizational level can be categorized as internal and external
social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002; Leana and Pil 2006).1 Internal social capital
describes the aggregate form and value of social relationships among organizational
members (e.g. Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993), whereas external social capital describes
the social linkages between the organization and other external actors (e.g. Burt 1992;
Uzzi 1996). In this paper, we focus on the internal social capital of cooperatives. In
other words, we treat a cooperative as a community and look at the structure and
1 Social scientists have categorized the forms of social capital in other ways, such as bonding and bridging
(e.g. Adler and Kwon 2002; De Carolis and Saparito 2006), or intra- and inter-organizational (e.g. Arregle
et al. 2007). These characterizations of social capital are similar to the internal and external view adopted in the
current study. See Payne et al. (2011) for a typology of social capital.
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content of relationships among its members, which facilitate the pursuit of collective
goals of the cooperative (Adler and Kwon 2002). For the sake of simplicity, the term
‘social capital’ hereafter refers to the internal social capital and our discussion is geared
to farmer cooperatives.
In the cooperative literature, many issues related to the notion of social capital,
including ideology, culture, value, trust, identity, norms, loyalty and commitment, have
been studied by scholars (e.g. Fulton and Adamowicz 1993; Hansen et al. 2002;
Valentinov 2004; James Jr. and Sykuta 2006; Bhuyan 2007; Nilsson et al. 2012). In
examining these studies, we find that an integrated analysis of social capital of
cooperatives is missing. Therefore, the primary purpose of this paper is to conduct a
literature review and develop a theoretical connection between social capital and
cooperative organizations.
Accordingly, we strive to achieve three objectives in this paper. The first objective is
to identify the content of social capital of cooperatives and the benefits resulting from it.
To achieve this objective, we adopt Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) three dimensions of
social capital: structural, cognitive, and relational. From the perspective of a system of
attributes (Milgrom and Roberts 1990), these social capital dimensions constitute the
social attributes of the cooperative, which must be aligned with the cooperative’s
governance attributes. By reviewing both cooperative and social capital literature, we
delineate each social capital dimension and discuss how they may generate comparative
advantages for cooperatives.
Second, this paper integrates diverse ideas and empirical facts that pertain to
cooperative social capital with cooperative lifecycle theory. Although social capital is
an asset of traditional cooperatives, the level of social capital in a cooperative is by no
means static. The development and expansion of the cooperative will change the
environment where social capital develops and sustains. Some researchers attribute
the failure of some large cooperatives to the decline of social capital in the organization
(Nilsson et al. 2012). In addition, the role of social capital varies under different
institutional contexts (Kraft and Brasch 2018). Based on Cook’s (1995) cooperative
lifecycle model, we describe the change of social capital along the cooperative lifecycle
and its potential impacts on cooperatives’ business performance. Our fundamental
argument is that the social capital level in a cooperative may decrease along the
cooperative lifecycle. The decrease of the level of social capital leads to an imbalance
of the social and economic attributes of the cooperative. When this happens, the
cooperative’s governance structure may become inefficient and need to be changed.
Third, and finally, we argue that it is important that cooperative leaders strategically
maintain and recover cooperative social capital over time. Otherwise, the comparative
advantage of cooperatives over IOFs may disappear. We discuss the implications for
the management practice in cooperatives. Specifically, we offer some suggestions to
maintain and recover social capital in large and modern cooperatives.
Our research contributes to the literature by specifying the content of each social
capital dimension of farmer cooperatives and how they may change along the cooper-
ative life cycle. There is a sizable literature specifying the content of social capital, i.e.,
structural, cognitive, and relational, as well as their interactions in the social community
and in general enterprises (e.g. Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Leana and Pil 2006). Many
cooperative scholars have emphasized the importance of social capital and tried to link
it with the development and performance of cooperatives (e.g., Liang et al. 2015;
Internal social capital and the life cycle of agricultural...
Nilsson et al. 2012; Valentinov 2004). However, owing to the multi-dimensionality of
the social capital concept, previous research usually focuses on specific facets or
components of social capital and uses various constructs to measure it. We are the first
to provide an analytical frame for the content and benefit of each dimension of internal
social capital of farmer cooperatives, based on an extensive review of the literature.
In the literature on organization life cycle, the changes of various features, e.g.
governance structure and management strategies, with the organization life cycle are
investigated (Smith et al. 1985; Lester et al. 2003). Some researchers demonstrate the
decline of social capital, which is mostly reduced to one dimension such as trust, as
organization size and complexity of cooperatives increase (Feng et al. 2016; Nilsson
et al. 2012). However, a comprehensive analysis regarding the change of social capital
along the whole life cycle of cooperatives, to the best of our knowledge, is not done.
The managerial contribution of the current paper lies in cooperative managers
having a better understanding of social capital in cooperatives and target at specific
dimensions of social capital to enhance coordination efficiency. Although it may be
beneficial to invest in all dimensions of social capital, it is costly to build and maintain
social capital (Mors 2010; Kraft and Brasch 2018). It is, therefore, relevant that
managers have knowledge regarding the specific stage that cooperatives are experienc-
ing and the features of social capital at that stage.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop an integrated analysis
of cooperative social capital. Section 3 contours the evolution of cooperative social
capital along the lifecycle with illustrative empirical evidence. In Section 4, we discuss
the practical implications of social capital for the management of cooperatives. The last
section encompasses conclusions and presents some implications for future research on
cooperative social capital.
2 Social capital and cooperatives
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), social capital is composed of three distinct
dimensions: structural, cognitive and relational. The measurement of social capital can
be operationalized according to these dimensions (e.g. Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Leana
and Pil 2006; Wu 2008). In the following subsections, each dimension will be
examined in the organizational setting of cooperatives. Our analysis aims at laying
the ground work of explaining how social capital will change along the lifecycle and
why cooperative decision makers should try to maintain it during the development of
cooperatives.
2.1 Structural dimension
The structural dimension of social capital reflects the overall pattern of social connec-
tions between the members of an organization, and the most important facets in this
dimension include the network ties, network configuration and appropriability
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
Network ties describe the social connections between people in an organization.
They are regarded as a fundamental aspect of social capital because ‘an actor’s network
of social ties creates opportunities for social capital transactions’ (Adler and Kwon
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2002; Inkpen and Tsang 2005). A cooperative is by design an organization with plenty
of social ties among its members. It is formed by a group of farmers voluntarily to
achieve their collective goals and interests. The members of a cooperative are not
anonymous financiers but real persons who run their own agricultural enterprises
(Nilsson et al. 2012). The collective ownership of the member group towards the
downstream processor and the local nature of the cooperative entail that the members
are likely to know each other and have social relationships (Cropp and Ingalsbe 1989;
Nilsson et al. 2012). Therefore, there exists a social network among the members of a
cooperative.
The configuration of a social network determines the pattern of linkages among
network members, such as the network hierarchy and relationships density, etc.
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). The social network in a cooperative is a combination
of horizontal and vertical social ties. The horizontal ties represent the social relation-
ships and interactions between members in the cooperative society. The vertical ties are
the social connections between the members and the cooperative processor and man-
agement. In cooperatives, the Board of Directors is elected from the membership, and,
historically, the CEO of a traditional cooperative is also a member.2 There is thus
personal acquaintance between the members and cooperative leaders. Furthermore, as
the members transact frequently with the cooperative processor, they meet with
management in a personal way regularly (Hendrikse and Feng 2013). Close social
relationships between them are expected to develop.
According to Bolino et al. (2002), ‘network appropriability relates to the ease with
which different types of relationships can be transferred within a network’. It measures
the extent to which a relationship developed in one context can be (re)used in other
contexts (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Pearson et al. 2008). Every cooperative repre-
sents simultaneously a social group and a joint enterprise (Valentinov 2004). As the
joint enterprise is owned and operated by the same group of members, the pre-existing
social relationships established between members in the community are thus transferred
into the joint enterprise and its business. The members’ economic activities in the
cooperative are highly embedded in their social network.
The structural social capital of a cooperative can be measured by the strength of
social ties, by the density of social network, and by the frequency of social interactions
among the members. Gargiulo and Benassi (2000) summarize the previous research on
social networks and conclude that ‘networks can help actors to coordinate critical task
interdependencies and to overcome the dilemmas of cooperation and collective action’.
Therefore, because a social network creates a platform for information sharing and
exchange (Gulati 1995; Walker et al. 1997; Sparrowe et al. 2001), a high level of
structural social capital is advantageous for both members and cooperatives. For
individual members, strong ties with similar producers may lead to spill-over effects
that result in an increase in efficiency and productivity (Levin and Reiss 1998). For the
cooperative firm, the close social connections between members and managers may
create a superior vertical information flow that significantly supports the collective
activities (Hendrikse and Feng 2013).
2 Nowadays, many cooperatives, especially in China, still use one of the members as a CEO, rather than hire
an outsider. Conversely, in Western countries, especially in the US, most cooperatives employ outside CEOs.
In Spain and Brazil, the situation is more mixed (Liang and Hendrikse 2013).
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2.2 Cognitive dimension
The cognitive dimension is the ‘shared representations, interpretations and systems of
meaning among parties, which reflects the members’ collective understanding of the
organization’s culture, shared vision and purpose, common language and codes, etc.’
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
The cooperative culture, vision, and purpose are carried by the ideology and values of
traditional cooperatives. They provide a good starting point for the members to develop
mutual understanding. When farmers take collective actions to found a cooperative, they
are supposed to agree on what their cooperative should do, and how to do it. They also
acknowledge the proper way of acting in such a community. The cooperative principles
such as the Rochdale principles contain a clearly discernible element of ideology describ-
ing these issues (Nilsson et al. 2012). In general, the cognitive foundation of cooperative
values, norms and beliefs in traditional cooperatives is to emphasize service to members
over profit, to subordinate individual goals to the good of the whole, and to value equality,
etc. (Hogeland 2004). For example, in Sweden, the old farmers ‘view the cooperative
memberships as a way of showing solidarity with peers, economic aspects being of
secondary importance’ (Hakelius 1999:31).
A cooperative will also develop common language or a set of codes among the
members. The geographical and production proximity entails that the members will
have similar production and marketing problems and thus less disagreement (Hendrikse
and Feng 2013). In addition, the frequent social interactions within the membership
network and the repeated transactions between the members and the processor will also
support the development of the system of shared meanings in the cooperative (Tsai and
Ghoshal 1998; Wu 2008).
The cognitive social capital of a cooperative can be measured by the extent to which
the members share congruent vision and goals. A high level of cognitive social capital
benefits cooperatives in several ways. First, it supports the collective actions of
members. People with shared vision are more willing to enter into cooperation (Tsai
and Ghoshal 1998). In addition, Leana and Pil (2006) argue that the shared goals in a
community can mitigate the free-riding problems and reduce the use of formal control
mechanisms. Second, the cognitive social capital promotes successful coordination by
facilitating effective communication and common perceptions among members. Inkpen
and Tsang (2005) claim that, ‘when a shared vision is present in the network, members
have similar perceptions as to how they should interact with one another’. A shared
vision provides members with the ability to communicate more effectively and avoid
possible misunderstanding in communications (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). In coopera-
tives, better communication increases the level of mutual understanding among mem-
bers and helps them anticipate the actions of other members (Hendrikse and Feng
2013). This will lead to the cooperative’s successful coordination of business activities
and adaptation to changing situations.
2.3 Relational dimension
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), the relational dimension of social capital is
composed of ‘trust, shared norms, perceived obligations, and a sense of mutual
identification’.
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Trust is the key facet of the relational dimension of social capital (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998). Bolino et al. (2002) summarize the prior research (e.g. Putnam 1993;
Tsai and Ghoshal 1998) and conclude that ‘trust facilitates social and resource ex-
change, increases communication, and enhances cooperation between individuals’.
When individuals trust each other, they are more likely to cooperate and participate
in the collective actions (Gulati 1995). The value of trust has been widely studied in the
cooperative literature. Researchers claim that cooperatives have greater organizational
trust than IOFs do, which exist both among the members and between the members and
processor (Shaffer 1987; Balbach 1998; Shapira 1999; Sykuta and Cook 2001; James
Jr. and Sykuta 2005). The trust in the cooperative makes the members willingly identify
themselves to the cooperative (Borgen 2001), be loyal to the cooperative (James Jr. and
Sykuta 2006), and actively participate in the cooperative governance (James Jr. and
Sykuta 2005; Österberg and Nilsson 2009; Barraud-Didier et al. 2012). The members’
trust towards their cooperative also makes them willing to accept the control of the
cooperative (Søgaard 1994) and leads to more efficient contracts between the members
and processor (Balbach 1998). Ollila et al. (2011) claim that ‘mutual trust between the
membership and their cooperative has through history enabled both members and
cooperatives to survive financially difficult times’.
A norm represents ‘a degree of consensus in the social system’ about the proper way
to behave (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). According to Coleman (1990), a norm exists
‘when the socially defined right to control an action is held not by the actor but by
others’. As a society with a dense social network and common ideology, a cooperative
is supposed to develop social norms emphasizing cooperation, reciprocity, and loyalty.
In cooperatives, members are willing to accept a high degree of social control via these
norms (Nilsson et al. 2012). Social control can curb free-riding problems by making
opportunistic behaviors more costly due to the threat of social sanctions and reputa-
tional effects (Granovetter 1985; Gulati et al. 2000). Therefore, the need for formal
control can be reduced (Adler and Kwon 2002).
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), ‘obligations represent a commitment or
duty to undertake some activity in the future’. Members’ obligations towards the
collective actions are crucial for cooperatives because their survival and success rely
on the patronage and member commitment (Fulton and Adamowicz 1993). When
members have a strong sense of obligation towards one another and towards their
cooperative, they will commit themselves by actively patronizing the cooperative
processor, providing risk capital, and participating in cooperative governance
(Österberg and Nilsson 2009).
Finally, identification is defined as ‘the process whereby individuals see themselves as
one with another person or a group of people’ (Nahapiet andGhoshal 1998). It is members’
sense of belonging to the cooperative. Group identity is beneficial for information exchange
and cooperation (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). It can also become a social motivation
(Akerlof andKranton 2005). In cooperatives, members’ sense of identity can be induced by
their common goals and a long history of social interactions. Gray and Kraenzle (1998)
underline the strong identification of members with their cooperative. Members’ identifi-
cationwith the cooperative is also a significant trust-makingmechanism (Borgen 2001) and
a source of members’ commitment (Jussila et al. 2012).
The relational social capital can be measured by the amount of trust members place
on each other and on management, by the strength of social norms in the community,
Internal social capital and the life cycle of agricultural...
and by the level of loyalty of members towards their cooperative. In general, the
relational social capital serves as the key resource for creating cooperatives’ compar-
ative advantage over IOFs. Successful cooperatives are characterized by possessing a
large stock of these relational social capital components, which facilitate the collabo-
rative behaviors and collective actions of members. On the other hand, there is evidence
showing that the future for cooperative business barely exists if there is no sufficient
relational social capital, such as trust, commitment and loyalty, to support collective
actions of farmers (e.g. Nilsson and Hendrikse 2011).
2.4 Relation between different dimensions
As Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) point out, although we can discuss the dimensions of
cooperative social capital separately for analytical reasons, they are closely interrelated.
We suggest that the three dimensions are complementary in nature, with each dimen-
sion reinforcing the other dimensions.
First, the structural dimension serves as an important resource for the creation of the
other two dimensions (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). Previous studies have suggested that
social ties and interactions promote trust between individuals (Gulati 1995; Granovetter
1985; Arregle et al. 2007). Norms are more firmly held and easier to enforce in a denser
social network (Granovetter 2005). In addition, the organization members’ social ties
and interactions support the formation of shared vision (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998) and
altruisms (Dur and Sol 2010). It is easy for members to share common values and
understanding of roles if they are closely connected (Podolny and Baron 1997). The
closure of a social network also facilitates the development of high levels of relational
and cognitive social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
Second, Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) propose that ‘the common values and a shared
vision, the major manifestations of the cognitive dimension of social capital, encourage
the development of trusting relationships’. Pearson et al. (2008) also argue that the
cognitive dimension serves as an antecedent to the relational dimension. They suggest
that ‘a shared vision will lead to collective trust and norms for fulfilment of the
common purpose’ (p.958). In addition, the cognitive social capital also supports the
development of the structural dimension because people who share the same mental
model, language and values are more likely to interact with one another and exchange
information regularly (Mohammed and Dumville 2001; Leana and Pil 2006).
Third, the relational dimension of social capital reinforces the creation of the other
dimensions. As Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argue, ‘trust creates anticipation of value
through social interactions with others and thus motivates actors to deepen relations and
pursue interactions’. In addition, ‘trusting relations allow for the transmission of more
information as well as richer and potentially more valuable information’ (Leana and Pil
2006).
3 Social capital along the lifecycle of cooperatives
The organization life cycle literature features various changes accompanying organi-
zation development and transition from one stage to the next (Jawahar and McLaughlin
2001; Lester et al. 2003). Social capital is closely bound with the development and
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strategy of the organization (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In this section, the evolution
of social capital in a cooperative is contoured along the cooperative lifecycle. We aim
to highlight the dynamics of social capital in cooperatives. Moreover, we explain the
formation, growth, decline, and change of cooperative organizations from the lens of
social capital and the coherence between social capital and governance structure, which
are considered as informal institution and formal institution, respectively.
Cook (1995:1155) suggests a five-stage lifecycle model for cooperatives: ‘(1)
economic justification and establishment, (2) survival of infant stage, (3) growth and
consolidation, whereby problems of so-called vaguely defined property rights appear,
(4) struggle against the vaguely defined property rights problems, (5) exiting,
restructuring (including choosing a hybrid model and involving outside co-owners),
or shifting (choosing an individualised cooperative model, including tradable delivery
rights)’. We propose that cooperatives in different stages of the lifecycle are featured
with different levels of social capital. Cooperatives are supposed to possess a high level
of social capital in the early stages of the lifecycle, which forms a coherent system with
the traditional cooperative governance structure. However, the level of social capital in
cooperatives exhibits a declining trend along the development of the organization
(Nilsson et al. 2012). We examine the ways in which certain organizational changes
in cooperatives affect each social capital dimension. In the last stages of the lifecycle, a
low social capital level in the cooperative is no longer aligned with the economic
attributes featured by the collective governance structure. The imbalance of social
capital and governance structure explains the cooperative’s common property problems
and loss of competiveness. We present some cases showing how cooperatives respond
to the imbalance of social and economic attributes.
3.1 Economic justification and establishment
While economic justifications, such as correction of market failures and better prices,
provide farmers various economic motives to form a cooperative, a high level of social
capital among the potential members initializes their collective actions. Regarding the
structural dimension, because most cooperatives start on a small scale, members are
usually well acquainted with each other and there are strong social ties among them
(Nilsson et al. 2012). The initial membership of cooperatives is mostly comprised of
farmers from the local community who are formerly connected and know each other
very well (Liang and Hendrikse 2013).
In a relatively small and close social network, the presence of frequent interactions,
common interests, and similar backgrounds promotes the development of a shared
vision in the community. Communication is effective in the social network and clear
objectives of the cooperative can be developed. The social ties and common vision thus
provide a condition for developing an initial coalition of potential members and the
formation of a stable membership. In a case study of an organic vegetable cooperative
in UK, a collective understanding of the organization’s culture and purpose is empha-
sized as one of the most important conditions for the establishment of the cooperative
(Liang et al. 2018).
The cooperative’s formation also needs a high level of relational social capital. The
pre-existing social ties provide information on potential members’ trustworthiness and
reliability. When the members pool their resources to form their cooperative, they
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create mutual dependence on each other. They must be confident that none will shirk
their commitments as business partners. Therefore, trust among the farmers is crucial
before they decide to invest time and money in the cooperative. The empirical study of
cooperative membership in Macedonia demonstrates that a low level of trust between
the farmers prevents them from taking any initiative in cooperative formation, although
they have a need for cooperatives to correct market failures (Nilsson and Hendrikse
2011). In fact, even after cooperatives, such as those in Russia, have been established in
a top-down way by governmental administration, these cooperatives have meagre
survival chances when the trust within the membership is low (Nilsson and
Hendrikse 2011).
Therefore, a high level of social capital can be regarded as the necessary condition
for the formation of cooperatives. During the establishment stage, the level of social
capital in a cooperative is high and it exists as a result of interpersonal relationships
developed from the informal social interactions among the members. The trust among
members and between members and management is high. Members are very loyal to
their cooperatives and maintain a high level of commitment.
3.2 Survival of infant stage
In the second stage of the lifecycle, the main objectives of cooperatives are confronting
market failure and generating more favorable prices than IOFs for their members. The
key to survive this stage is that benefits outweighs costs (Cook 1995). It is therefore
important that social capital supports the cooperative business through promoting
cooperation and improving coordination and operating efficiency. The structural di-
mension of social capital is manifested as the social ties and interactions in the
cooperative community. It supports the dispersion of production technology and
knowledge among the members (Peterson and Anderson 1996).
By facilitating common language and meanings, the cognitive social capital supports
the collective actions of the members by improving communication efficiency. In
addition, when there are mutual understandings and common goals among the mem-
bers, a consensus in decision-making is easy to achieve. The costs associated with
collective decision-making in the cooperative are thus low.
Relational social capital strongly benefits cooperatives by serving as social mecha-
nisms supporting both coordination and control. According to Borgen (2001), coordi-
nation and control in cooperatives cannot be fully accomplished by means of prices or
authority. Successful cooperatives are characterized by their capacity to overcome this
gap with the strength of relational social capital, featured by a high level of trust and
strong social norms. As the trust between members makes them believe that nobody
will shirk his duties, the cooperative is able to reduce the time and costs spent on
expensive controlling measures such as formal contracts, information gathering, mon-
itoring, and surveillance. Social norms in the cooperative mitigate the opportunistic
behaviors and generate certain routines in transactions and collective actions. The costs
of formal control and coordination are further saved. As such, the informal mechanisms
steered by the relational social capital play a crucial role in the early stage of cooper-
ative development.
Chloupkova et al.’s (2003) case study of the Danish cooperative dairy movement
highlights the value of a high social capital level. From 1882, an increasing number of
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Danish peasants committed themselves to deliver all their milk to their own coopera-
tives. The cooperatives were formed by circles of energetic entrepreneurs in the local
rural communities and ‘valuable social capital was created bottom-up’ (p.243). The
cooperative dairies became very successful and the quality of the butter was increased.
It became possible to standardize output and thus demand higher prices. The social
control mechanism guaranteed that none of the members would cheat on quality and
the milk was delivered in good condition. In general, as a high level of social capital
reduces the tendencies to free ride and default for individual advantage (Paldam and
Svendsen 2000), it guaranteed the milk quality under complete pooling while no strict
formal control was provided at such an early stage of the Danish dairy cooperatives.
Recent evidence from Kenya and China also shows that the observed differences in the
performance of producer cooperatives can be explained by the differences in the
organizations’ social capital levels (Wambugu et al. 2009; Liang et al. 2015).
3.3 Growth and consolidation
In stage three of the lifecycle, successful cooperatives become large and complex by
expanding horizontally and vertically. Conflicts, i.e. free rider, horizon, portfolio, control,
and influence cost problems, arise due to the vaguely defined property rights over residual
claims and decision control. However, while facilitating the growth and competitiveness of
cooperatives, the social capital level in cooperatives may decline gradually and become
quite low in large and complex cooperatives (Nilsson et al. 2012). First, the structural social
capital decreases. The expansion of the cooperative will create a large and heterogeneous
membership (Nilsson et al. 2012). It becomes infeasible for members to maintain social
connections with most people in a large society. As a consequence, the social ties between
members becomeweaker, the cohesiveness of member community disappears, the distance
between members and management increases, and communication problems emerge
(Nilsson et al. 2009; Österberg and Nilsson 2009). The technological developments such
as electronic transactions, which have increasingly replaced face-to-face transactions, may
also hamper the development and maintenance of intimate connections between members
and the cooperative (Byrne and McCarthy 2005). When the cooperative becomes large, it
needs to hire professional executives who are not from the membership (Feng 2011).
Information asymmetry between the members and the professional management may
increase (Nilsson and Hendrikse 2011). In addition, as the cooperative develops, members
have decreasing involvement in the cooperatives’ decision making and management
becomes increasingly autonomous (Bager 1996; Harte 1997; Bhuyan 2007; Bijman et al.
2013). The case study of the cheese cooperative De Producent in Gouda, the Netherlands,
provides a good example (Peng et al. 2016). In the past two decades, most of the active
members of the cooperative developed from farming households into modern farming
enterprises, which are managed by professional teams and have large scales of production.
Some of them reach an annual revenue of more than one million Euros. The members
spread in the radius of 100 km around Gouda. They focus mainly on the production
activities and rarely interact with each other. The communication is mainly between the
members and the cooperative processor. In such a modern cooperative, there is no much
space for members to develop social ties between each other.
Second, the large and heterogeneous membership has detrimental effects on the
cognitive social capital. According to Hogeland (2006), the culture of traditionally
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organized cooperatives vanishes gradually as the cooperative expands. The social
interactions in cooperatives, which serve as the mechanism to develop and maintain
shared beliefs and values, become less frequent when the cooperative membership is
large. The pronounced heterogeneity in membership, such as size, geographical loca-
tion, knowledge, interests, even nationality, makes it difficult for members to develop
common values and organizational language. Moreover, cooperative ideology plays a
less prominent role in cooperatives nowadays. According to Fulton (1995), changes in
society’s values are likely to make cooperation more difficult. Profitability becomes the
priority of the members. Farmers today, especially the young generation of farmers, are
more pragmatic about their cooperatives and members’ decisions are based mainly on
economic terms (Hakelius 1999; Karantininis and Zago 2001).
Finally, following the decline of the structural and cognitive social capital, the
relational social capital decreases. Horizontally, with less interaction in the member-
ship, the traditional conditions for personal trust building are no longer in place
(Granovetter 1985). At the same time, ‘the larger the group, the lower is its ability to
crystallize and enforce norms, including those against free-riding behaviors’
(Granovetter 2005). Bijman and Verhees (2011) also find that members’ commitment
decreases in the geographical size of cooperatives. Vertically, Hogeland (2006) argues
that the stricter hierarchical control mechanisms demanded by the vertical coordination
may lead to a negative attitude and commitment of the members towards their
cooperatives. The lack of communication between the members and cooperative
leaders will lead to low trust of members in management. The shrinking members’
control in large cooperatives makes the members care less about the governance of their
cooperative and increase the agency costs. As the cooperative becomes large, it acts
more like IOFs, and becomes more corporate-oriented (Hind 1997, 1999; Nilsson and
Ollila 2009). The identification of members with the cooperative weakens (Borgen
2001). ‘Members consider their relationship with the cooperative purely in business
terms’ (Ollila et al. 2013), and the behavioral constraints that social mechanisms can
place on members are much weaker.
The decrease of social capital in a cooperative in its expansion stage can be
attributed to the change in factors that shape the evolution of social capital, namely,
time, interaction, interdependence and closure (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In gen-
eral, the expansion of a cooperative over time may change all or most of these factors
by modifying the social structure of a cooperative community, decreasing the possibil-
ity of interactions among members, lowering the interdependency between members,
and weakening the identity of membership. Consequently, the trust, common vision,
loyalty and other elements of social capital disappear in the minds of the members. The
extent of social capital decline may vary among countries/regions, depending on the
high-level culture. The decline of social capital in cooperatives in some Asian coun-
tries, especially in China where the social harmony culture dominates, may be gentler
(Bernardi and Miani 2014).
3.4 Struggle against the vaguely defined property rights problems
In stage four of the lifecycle, cooperatives are confronted with more serious conflicts of
property rights issues. Cooperatives therefore begin to struggle for decisions regarding
exit, continue, and transition, based on the trade-offs between vaguely defined property
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rights and unique benefits such as the elimination of the double mark-up and the
competitive yardstick (Cook 1995; Liang and Hendrikse 2016). The common property
rights in cooperatives are based on a high degree of collectivism. When there is
insufficient social capital to support the collectivism in the governance structure, the
common property rights structure is no longer appropriate. The vaguely defined
property rights problems surface and become acute (Nilsson et al. 2012). Essentially,
these problems are rooted in the imbalance of the social and economic attributes of
cooperatives. In other words, the governance structure featured by collective income
and decision rights allocation is no longer coherent with the decreasing social capital
level.
Therefore, the vaguely defined property rights problems are typically interrelated
with the low level of social capital in cooperatives. Borgen (2004) states that the
adverse consequences of the common property rights are expected to appear in the
form of weak membership commitment. The combination of traditional equitable
policies and a low level of social capital may cause free-riding problems and the
adverse selection of efficient members (Hendrikse 2011; Pennerstorfer and Weiss
2013). In addition, the decrease of the social capital level forms a vicious cycle with
the vaguely defined property rights problems. For example, if members don’t have trust
in their cooperative’s long-run perspective, they will have a strong desire for low
retained earnings and a short redemption period, reflected as the horizon problem.
On the other hand, the members who become dissatisfied with the common property
rights will continuously lose their loyalty towards their cooperative. As such, a low
level of social capital aggravates the vaguely defined property rights problems, and in
turn, these problems further erode cooperative social capital. As the low social capital
level jeopardizes the foundation of the collective governance structure of the cooper-
ative, the cooperative loses its competiveness gradually and faces the risk of being
abandoned by its members. At the end of stage four, some cooperatives recognize the
imbalance of the social and economic attributes of cooperatives and consider options
for change, which leads to stage five of the lifecycle.
3.5 Exit, restructuring, or shifting
In attempting to solve the vaguely defined property rights problems, cooperatives
choose among three aforementioned strategies (Cook 1995). Some choose the exit
strategies of liquidation, some convert to an IOF structure, and others stay with the
cooperative form but decide to restructure or shift the governance structure.
One governance structure restructuring strategy cooperatives can adopt is to change
their collective income rights structure into more individualistic forms, e.g. replacing
complete pooling with partial or no pooling, introducing individualized and tradable
ownership rights, differentiated member treatment, etc. (Chaddad and Cook 2004;
Hendrikse 2011). These solutions can be seen as a strategic move of cooperatives to
align their economic attributes with the new status of the social attributes. The Greenery
is an example of cooperative development and restructuring during stage three to stage
five of the cooperative lifecycle. Specifically, The Greenery chose to convert its income
rights structure from a collective to an individualistic form (Hendrikse 2011).
The Greenery is a leading fruit and vegetable company in Europe. As the outcome of
a merger of nine Dutch regional fruit and vegetable auction cooperatives, the new
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cooperative has been struggling in implementing its new strategy and in finding the
most appropriate organization (Bijman 2002; Hendrikse 2011). Besides the large size
(approximately 9000 members), The Greenery’s membership heterogeneity increased
due to the fact that ‘consumers’ demand for more variety and higher quality has
induced some growers to innovate’ (Hendrikse 2011). In the first few years after the
merger, some large growers left the cooperative because of ‘cross-subsidization of
small growers’ (Bijman and Hendrikse 2003). Meanwhile, some innovative producers
also left because the equality principle of pooling limits the payoff they could receive
for their innovation efforts (Hendrikse 2011). Explained from the social capital per-
spective, The Greenery, as a large and complex cooperative, has difficulty in
maintaining social capital in the organization. As Bijman (2002) points out, the
organizational changes after the merger resulted in dissatisfaction among growers and
part of the dissatisfaction was caused by ‘a lack of communication between The
Greenery and members’. Members’ loyalty and commitment is no longer in place to
serve as their social motivation to stay with and deliver to the cooperative. Driven
mainly by economic benefits, the members who are not compensated for their higher
product quality or larger volume would simply leave the cooperative to trade with IOFs
or form a new cooperative. This process was finally countered by the introduction of
member benefit programs in The Greenery, which ‘increased the number and extent of
quality attributes covered by specific clauses in the incentive contracts’ (Hendrikse
2011). It entails that members realize the payoff for higher product quality by receiving
a quality-specific price. With the member benefit programs, the cooperatives adopted
strong and individualistic quality incentives. The Greenery case illustrates the necessity
of adjusting the income rights structure according to the cooperative’s social attributes.
In a large and complex cooperative with heterogeneous membership, when social
capital seems to have played a limited role in members’ decision making, adopting
individualistic income rights allocation is necessary.
Instead of changing the income rights structure, cooperatives can also choose to
maintain or recover social capital during the development of the organization. Although
it may become increasingly difficult as the membership base expands and becomes
more heterogeneous (Valentinov 2004), it can still be very successful. However, as
social capital takes a long time to build, it thus requires management’s continuous
efforts and great endeavor (Putnam 1993).
Table 1 summaries the changes of each dimension of social capital along coopera-
tive life cycle. A cooperative is characterized by a high level of social capital featured
by the strong social ties, common vision, and high trust within the membership. During
the early stages of life cycle. Different dimensions of social capital are mutually-
reinforcing and complementary to each other. The governance structure of the cooper-
ative is featured by the collective income and decision rights allocation. A unique
feature of cooperatives’ income rights structure is that members hold the residual
claims collectively and receive benefits proportional to their patronage (Dunn 1988).
Pooling is a prominent element in the income rights structure of traditional coopera-
tives. It entails that ‘revenues and costs are to a certain extent allocated independent of
quantity and/or quality’ (Hendrikse and Feng 2013). The members thus receive
collective instead of individualistic incentives for their patronage. Regarding decision
rights, members usually have equal voting power and make decisions collectively
based on the one-member-one-vote principle (Hansmann 1996). With the collective
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governance structure, traditional cooperatives are supposed to face organizational
inefficiencies due to the opportunistic behaviors and high collective decision-making
costs. However, the presence of a high level of social capital complements the
collective governance structure by controlling and coordinating the members’ activities
via social mechanisms.
Let’s take the other polar of governance structure, an IOF, as an example of the
choice of the last stage. An IOF has a different set of social and governance attribute
values featured by a relatively low social capital level in combination with an individ-
ualistic governance structure. It is owned by investors and it primary goal is to give its
investors the highest investment return. The farmers are only the suppliers of the IOF
and the relationship between the farmers and the IOF is seen as solely seller-buyer. The
farmers, as individual suppliers, are not supposed to socialize with each other as
frequently as the cooperative members will do. Therefore, there is a low social capital
level among the farmers, and between the farmers and the IOF. When the farmers
deliver their produce to the IOF, they receive an individual instead of a pooled price.
The economic incentives are individualized. The investors of the IOF are the holders of
decision rights, although these rights are usually delegated to the CEO, who ‘often has
substantial control over setting, ratifying and implementing company policy’
(Hendrikse and Feng 2013). In the IOF, economic incentives instead of social mech-
anisms play the dominant role of controlling and coordinating economic activities. The
individualistic governance structure is thus coherent with the low social capital level.
We argue that the cooperative and the IOF are both efficient because their social and
governance attributes are coherent. Changing the value of a particular without changing
the values of other attributes may lead to a serious loss in the organizational efficiency
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Brynjolfsson and Milgrom 2013). Liang et al. (2018)
report that social capital in cooperatives featured by a high level of collective gover-
nance structure plays a more important role than that in cooperatives with a lower level
of collective income rights. For the cooperative, if one or some values of its social
attributes change, the cooperative may become inefficient if the collective income or
decision rights allocation in the governance structure remain the same. To avoid
organizational inefficiency and failure, a new combination of attribute values must be
forged.
3.6 Management implications
In this section, we focus on the implications of the study of social capital for the
management practice in cooperatives and discuss how cooperatives can maintain and
recover social capital.
Agricultural cooperatives have been faced with the challenges of new market
conditions. To respond to the intensified competition and differentiated demands of
the market, many cooperatives choose to expand horizontally or/and vertically. As a
consequence, cooperatives become large in size and complex in organizational struc-
ture. Meanwhile, cooperatives start to adopt the competitive strategies and control
mechanisms similar to those used usually by the IOFs (Bijman and Wollni 2009).
Cooperatives nowadays are becoming more and more akin to IOFs, and gradually,
‘members consider their relationship with the cooperative purely in business terms’
(Ollila et al. 2013). However, all these strategies of a cooperative aiming for economic
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success are at the cost of its social capital, which happens to be the cooperative’s
comparative advantage over IOFs. Nilsson et al. (2012) warn that:
‘If a cooperative is not aware of its comparative advantage in terms of social
capital, and therefore does not protect it, it risks losing this form of capital in the
process of developing into a large-scale enterprise. Consequently, profits from
economies of scale and scope may be outweighed by loss of social capital
mirrored in less trust among members and between members and leaders,
alienation and passivity among members, low involvement, weak democratic
governance, private good provision rather than collective good provision, wide-
spread free riding, low satisfaction, and loss of solidarity.’
Cooperatives largely rely on members’ collective actions. Our discussion of coopera-
tive social capital along the lifecycle suggests that social capital can be regarded as a
key success factor of cooperatives. Therefore, when cooperatives respond to changing
market conditions and modify their structures from the traditional to innovative forms,
they must develop means to maintain or even increase social capital (Ollila et al. 2013).
The primary mechanisms by which social capital can be maintained and increased
reside in each social capital dimension. First, as the structural dimension serves as the
basic resource for the creation of social capital, the most obvious way for a cooperative
to build social capital is to foster the social relationships among its members (Leana
et al. 1999). Cooperatives should invest in maintaining the membership network by
promoting social interactions between members. This can be done by creating social
events and gatherings of members, developing an appropriate communication policy,
organizing workshops and training seminars, and so on. In addition, cooperatives
should put efforts into keeping the membership stable. According to Inkpen and Tsang
(2005), ‘a highly unstable network may limit the opportunities for the creation of social
capital, because when an actor leaves the network, ties disappear’.
Second, the cognitive dimension can be developed through the effective communi-
cation of cooperatives’ shared goals and values. Cooperatives should provide education
about the nature and benefits of cooperation to members to reinforce the cooperative
ideology (Byrne and McCarthy 2005). For instance, before launching the new payment
scheme, Friesland Campina, one of the largest dairy cooperatives in the world, spent
one year in conveying the message to members about the market potential of lactose
and explaining to them why the cooperative should increase the investment of the
value-added products in that area. These member education programs help members
understand the businesses with which they are unfamiliar and win their common
understanding. Cooperatives can also establish a shared vision by selecting and re-
warding members who value working collectively (Leana et al. 1999). As frequent
interactions evoke the development of shared language and understanding among
group members, the suggested investment in the structural dimension will also benefit
the growth of cognitive social capital.
Finally, drawing on the discussion in Section 2, the relational dimension is highly
dependent on the development of the first two dimensions. Consistent with this idea,
the cooperative’s investment in the structural and cognitive dimension will ultimately
lead to the development of its relational social capital. For example, frequent commu-
nication between the members and management will enhance the trust and loyalty of
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members towards the cooperative (Barraud-Didier et al. 2012). Trechter et al. (2002)
also show that cooperative communication strategies have the potential to increase
members’ commitment. In addition, cooperatives should develop measures to encour-
age members to participate in cooperative governance. Previous study suggests that
members’ access to information and their feeling of control over the cooperative
strengthen their trust and commitment (e.g. Fulton 1999; Birchall and Simmons
2004; Byrne and McCarthy 2005; Österberg and Nilsson 2009). Finally, the case of
CRS described in the previous section provides an illustrative example of recovery of
social capital through strengthening cooperative identity.
Furthermore, cooperatives should pay attention to the complex relationship between
social capital and governance structure. In the last stages of the lifecycle, many
cooperatives confront the vaguely defined property rights problems by introducing
individualistic income rights structure and transferable and appreciable equity shares.
This change of cooperative governance structure provides members with more
economic motivation for patronage commitment and equity contribution. However,
the consequence of this motivation on cooperative social capital is still unclear. One
possibility is that the new governance structure with strong and individualistic
economic incentives will lead to economic success of the cooperative and social
capital is, in turn, reinforced by the economic success. This phenomenon can be
found in the CRS case described above. Cechin et al. (2013) also find that stricter
hierarchical control mechanisms actually have a positive effect on members’ commit-
ment. In this situation, the individualistic governance structure and a high social capital
level form a new coherent system of attributes. Another possibility is that strong and
individualistic economic incentives in combination with formal control mechanisms
will crowd out the intrinsic motivation of members and suppress trust (Malhotra and
Murnighan 2002; Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012). It decreases the cooperative’s
social capital level. Ultimately, the cooperative is featured by an individualistic gover-
nance structure and a low social capital level in the system of attributes, which is similar
to IOFs. Therefore, a better understanding of both possibilities is crucial for cooperative
leaders when they consider the change in governance structure.
4 Conclusion and further research
In this paper, we seek to understand how social capital exists within cooperatives and
how social capital affects the cooperative business. We adopt Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s
(1998) conceptualization of social capital, and provide an integrated analysis of the
structural, cognitive and relational dimensions of social capital in cooperatives. Spe-
cifically, we complement the previous research on cooperative social capital by
delineating the links between the three dimensions of social capital and the governance
structure of cooperatives.
The second focus of this paper is to study the social capital in cooperatives from the
perspective of the cooperative lifecycle. During the early stages of the lifecycle, the
social capital level in cooperatives is high. It serves as the basis for the formation,
survival, and success of cooperatives. The high level of social capital in cooperatives
deters free-riding behavior and promotes stable cooperation among members. Howev-
er, social capital in cooperatives will decline as the cooperatives become large in size
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and complex in structure. Cooperatives’ market-oriented strategies and approaches of
horizontal and vertical expansion may bring economic success, but in the meantime,
the loss of social capital may outweigh the economic gain. When the low level of social
capital upsets the balance between social and economic attributes, the cooperative may
lose its efficiency. Cooperatives in this stage of the lifecycle shall adopt strategies that
can rebalance the social and economic attributes, either by restoring cooperative social
capital or by changing the income rights structure.
In order to maintain organizational social capital, it is important for the organi-
zation and its members to understand the benefits and value of social capital.
Therefore, cooperative leaders shall be aware of the differences between coopera-
tives and IOFs and pay special attention to the social attributes of their organizations.
Moreover, management shall elicit efforts of members in maintaining social capital
in their cooperatives. We offer some suggestions on maintaining and restoring social
capital in large and modern cooperatives. These measures cover the different di-
mensions of social capital. In addition, as the relationship between social capital and
governance structure is still equivocal, cooperatives should take the potential costs
of social capital into consideration when any decision of cooperative restructuring is
made.
Given the significant importance of cooperative social capital, further research on
this topic is warranted. We would like to suggest some avenues for further theoret-
ical and empirical work. First of all, researchers can further explore the dimensions
of social capital to identify the means by which these dimensions affect each other
and affect other important organizational outcomes. One shortcoming of the previ-
ous research of social capital in cooperatives is the weak empirical support on many
specific predictions of the value of social capital. Thus, further empirical research is
highly desirable. The outcome of this type of research will provide practical impli-
cations for cooperative decision makers who want to maintain and recover cooper-
ative social capital effectively and, in turn, sustain cooperatives’ comparative
advantage.
Second, we analyze the internal social capital of cooperatives on the organizational
level in this paper, although the external/bridging social capital held by specific
individuals may affect the behavior of the individuals and the performance of organi-
zations as well (Burt 1992). External social capital is often operationalized in research
as the social connections held by top managers (Leana and Pil 2006). The research on
Chinese cooperatives shows that, the CEO and core members play an important role in
their cooperative due to their rich external contacts and social resources (Liang 2013;
Liang et al. 2015). This type of social capital is beyond the scope of the present paper
and deserves more investigation.
Finally, the studies of social capital in cooperatives only focus on the positive side
of social capital so far. However, social capital may also have a ‘dark side’
(Nooteboom 2007). The cohesiveness of a cooperative society may be harmful for
the cooperative development in some respects. For example, Leana et al. (1999)
point out the maintenance costs associated with social capital. In addition, excessive
social capital may also result in an overly closed network, limiting access to external
resources, and impeding actors’ ability to adapt to changing task environments (Uzzi
1997). The trade-off between the positive and negative impacts of the social capital
needs to be evaluated further.
Internal social capital and the life cycle of agricultural...
Acknowledgements This study was funded by the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province (Grant
No. LY19G030030) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71573227).
Funding This study was funded by the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province (Grant No.
LY19G030030) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71573227).
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest There is no conflict of interest.
References
Adler PS, Kwon S (2002) Social capital: prospects for a new concept. Acad Manag Rev 27:17–40
Akerlof GE, Kranton RE (2005) Identity and the economics of organizations. J Econ Perspect 19(1):9–32
Arregle J, Hitt MA, Sirmon DG, Very P (2007) The development of organisational social capital: attributes of
family firms. J Manag Stud 44(1):73–95
Bager T (1996) Organisations in sectors. Explaining the dissemination of populations of formal organization
in economic sectors – bridging rational choice and institutional approaches. South Jutland University
Press, Esbjerg
Barraud-Didier V, Henninger M-C, Akremi AE (2012) The relationship between members’ trust and
participation in the governance of cooperatives: the role of organisational commitment. Int Food
Agribusiness Mgnt Rev 15(1):1–24
Bernardi A, Miani M (2014) The long march of Chinese co-operatives: towards market economy, participa-
tion, and sustainable development. Asia Pacific Business Rev 20(3):330–355
Bhuyan S (2007) The people factor in cooperatives: an analysis of members’ attitudes and behavior. Can J
Agric Econ 55(3):275–298
Bijman, W.J.J. (2002). Essays on Agricultural Cooperatives: Governance Structure in Fruit and Vegetable
Markets. Ph.D. Thesis, EPS-2002-015-ORG, ISBN: 90–5892–024-0, Rotterdam School of Management,
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Bijman, W.J.J. and Verhees, V. (2011). Member or customer? Farmer commitment to supply cooperatives.
Paper for the 5th international conference on economics and Management of Networks (EMNet), held in
Limassol, Cyprus, on December 1-3, 2011
Bijman WJJ, Hendrikse GWJ (2003) Co-operatives in chains: institutional restructuring in the Dutch fruit and
vegetable industry. J Chain Network Sci 3(2):95–107
Bijman WJJ, Wollni M (2009) Producer organizations and vertical coordination: an economic organization
theory perspective. In: Rösner HJ, Schulz-Nieswandt F (eds) Beiträge der genossenschaftlichen
Selbsthilfe zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung. LIT-Verlag, Berlin, pp 231–252
Bijman WJJ, Hendrikse GWJ, van Oijen AA (2013) Accommodating two worlds in one organization:
changing board models in agricultural cooperatives. Manag Decis Econ 34:204–217
Birchall J, Simmons J (2004) What motivates members to participate in co-operative and mutual businesses?
A theoretical model and some findings. Annals Publ Cooperative Econ 75(3):465–495
Boland RJ, Tenkasi RV (1995) Perspective making and perspective taking in communities of knowing. Organ
Sci 6:350–372
Bolino MC, Turnley WH, Bloodgood JM (2002) Citizenship behavior and the creation of social capital in
organizations. Acad Manag Rev 27:505–522
Bonus H (1986) The cooperative association as a business enterprise: a study of the economics of transactions.
J Inst Theor Econ 142(2):310–339
Borgen SO (2001) Identification as a trust-generating mechanism in cooperatives. Annals Publ Cooperative
Econ 72(2):208–228
Borgen SO (2004) Rethinking incentive problems in cooperative organizations. J Socio-Econ 33:383–393
Bowles S, Polania-Reyes S (2012) Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements? J
Econ Lit 50(2):368–425
Brynjolfsson E, Milgrom P (2013) Complementarity in organizations. In: Gibbons R, Roberts J (eds) The
handbook of organizational economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 11–55
Burt RS (1992) Structural holes: the social structure of competition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
W. Deng et al.
Byrne N, McCarthy O (2005) An analysis of the credit union’s use of Craig’s commitment building measures.
J Co-Operative Stud 38(1):20–27
Cechin A, Bijman J, Pascucci S, Omta O (2013) Decomposing the member relationship in agricultural
cooperatives: implications for commitment. Agribusiness 29:39–61
Chaddad FR, Cook ML (2004) Understanding new cooperative models: an ownership control rights typology.
Rev Agric Econ 26:348–360
Chloupkova J, Svendsen GLH, Svendsen GT (2003) Building and destroying social capital: the case of
cooperative movements in Denmark and Poland. Agric Hum Values 20:241–252
Coleman JS (1990) Foundations of social theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Cook ML (1995) The future of US agricultural cooperatives: a neo-institutional approach. Am J Agric Econ
77(5):1153–1159
Cropp, R. and Ingalsbe, G. (1989). Structure and scope of agricultural cooperatives. In Cobia, D. (eds.),
Cooperatives in agriculture. Prentice Hall
De Carolis DM, Saparito P (2006) Social capital, cognition, and entrepreneurial opportunities: A theoretical
framework. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 30(1):41–56
Dunn JR (1988) Basic cooperative principles and their relationship to selected practices. J Agricult Coop 3:83–93
Dur R, Sol J (2010) Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives. Games Econ Behavior 69:293–301
Feng, L. (2011). Motivation, Coordination and Cognition in Cooperatives. Ph.D. Thesis, EPS-2010-220-
ORG, ISBN 978–90–5892-261-8, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
Feng L, Friis A, Nilsson J (2016) Social capital among members in grain marketing cooperatives of different
sizes. Agribusiness 32(1):113–126
Fulton M (1995) The future of cooperatives in Canada: a property rights approach. Am J Agric Econ 77:1144–
1152
Fulton M (1999) Cooperatives and member commitment. Finnish J Business Econ 4:418–437
Fulton JR, Adamowicz WL (1993) Factors that influence the commitment of members to their cooperative
organization. J Agric Coop 8:39–53
Gargiulo M, Benassi M (2000) Trapped in your own net? Network cohesion, structural holes, and the
adaptation of social capital. Organ Sci 11(2):183–196
Granovetter M (1985) Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. Am J Sociol
91(3):481–510
Granovetter M (2005) The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. J Econ Perspect 19(1):33–50
Gray, T.W. and Kraenzle, C.A. (1998). Member participation in agricultural cooperatives: a regression and
scale analysis. USDA RBS research report 165, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
Gulati R (1995) Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in
alliances. Acad Manag J 38:85–112
Gulati R, Norhria N, Zaheer A (2000) Strategic networks. Strateg Manag J 21:203–215
Hakelius K (1999) Farmer cooperatives in the 21st century: young and old farmers in Sweden. J Rural
Cooperation 27(1):31–54
Hansen MH, Morrow JL Jr, Bastista JC (2002) The impact of trust on cooperative membership retention,
performance, and satisfaction: an exploratory study. Int Food Agribusiness Manag Rev 5:41–59
Hansmann H (1996) The ownership of Enterprise. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Harte LN (1997) Creeping privatisation of the Irish co-operatives: a transaction cost explanation. In: Nilsson J, van
Dijk G (eds) Strategies and Structures in the Agro-food Industries. van Gorcum, The Netherlands, pp 31–53
Hendrikse GWJ (1998) Screening, competition and the choice of marketing cooperative as an organisational
form. J Agric Econ 49(2):202–217
Hendrikse GWJ (2011) Pooling, access, and countervailing power in channel governance. Manag Sci 57(9):
1692–1702
Hendrikse, G.W.J. and Feng, L. (2013). Interfirm cooperative. In Anna Grandori (eds.), Handbook of
economic organization: integrating economic and organization theory: 501–521. Edward Elgar
Publishing
Hendrikse GWJ, Veerman CP (2001a) Marketing cooperatives and financial structure: a transaction costs
economics analysis. Agric Econ 26(3):205–216
Hendrikse GWJ, Veerman CP (2001b) Marketing co-operatives: an incomplete contracting perspective. J
Agric Econ 52(1):53–64
Hind AM (1997) The changing values of the cooperative and its business focus. Am J Agric Econ 79:1077–1082
Hind AM (1999) Co-operative life cycle and goals. J Agric Econ 50:536–548
Hueth B, Marcoul P (2009) Incentive pay for CEOs in cooperative firms. Am J Agric Econ 91(5):1218–1223
Hogeland JA (2004) How culture drives economic behavior in cooperatives. J Rural Coop 32(1):19–36
Internal social capital and the life cycle of agricultural...
Hogeland JA (2006) The economic culture of U.S. agricultural cooperatives. Cultural Agric 28(2):67–79
Inkpen AC, Tsang EWK (2005) Social capital, networks, and knowledge transfer. Acad Manag Rev 30(1):
146–165
James HS Jr, Sykuta ME (2005) Property right and organizational characteristics of producer-owned firms and
organizational trust. Annals Publ Coop Econ 76(4):545–580
James HS Jr, Sykuta ME (2006) Farmer trust in producer- and investor-owned firms: evidence from Missouri
corn and soybean producers. Agribusiness: An Int J 22(1):135–153
Jawahar IM, McLaughlin GL (2001) Toward a descriptive stakeholder theory: an organizational life cycle
approach. Acad Manag Rev 26(3):397–414
Jussila I, Byrne N, Tuominen H (2012) Affective commitment in co-operative organizations: what makes
members want to stay? Int Bus Res 5(10):1–10
Karantininis K, Zago A (2001) Cooperatives and membership commitment: endogenous memberships in
mixed duopsonies. Am J Agric Econ 83:1266–1272
Kraft PS, Brasch A (2018) Managerial social networks and innovation: a meta-analysis of bonding and
bridging effects across institutional environments. J Prod Innov Manag 35(6):865–889
Levin RC, Reiss PC (1998) Cost-reducing and demand-creating R&D with spillovers. RAND J Econ 19(4):
538–556
Leana CR, van Buren HJ, III (1999) Organizational social capital and employment practices. AcadManag Rev
24:538–555
Leana CR, Pil FK (2006) Social capital and organizational performance: evidence from urban public schools.
Organ Sci 17:353–366
Lester DL, Parnell JA, Carraher S (2003) Organizational life cycle: A five-stage empirical scale. Int J
Organizational Analysis 11(4):339–354
Liang, Q. (2013). Governance, CEO Identity, and Quality Provision of Farmer Cooperatives. Ph.D. Thesis,
EPS-2013-281-ORG, ISBN 978–90–5892-325-7, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus
University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Liang Q, Hendrikse GWJ (2013) Cooperative CEO identity and efficient governance: member or outside
CEO? Agribusiness 29(1):23–38
Liang Q, Hendrikse G (2016) Pooling and the yardstick effect of cooperatives. Agric Syst 143:97–105
Liang Q, Huang Z, Lu H, Wang X (2015) Social capital, member participation, and cooperative performance:
evidence from China’s Zhejiang. Int Food Agribusiness Manag Rev 18(1):49–78
Liang Q, Lu H, Deng W (2018) Between social capital and formal governance in farmer cooperatives:
evidence from China. Outlook Agric 47(3):196–203
Malhotra D, Murnighan JK (2002) The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust. Adm Sci Q 47:534–559
Milgrom P, Roberts J (1990) The economics of modern manufacturing: technology, strategy, and organiza-
tion. Am Econ Rev 80(3):511–528
Mohammed S, Dumville BC (2001) Team mental models in a team knowledge framework: expanding theory
and measurement across disciplinary boundaries. J Organ Behav 22:89–106
Mors ML (2010) Innovation in a global consulting firm: when the problem is too much diversity. Strateg
Manag J 31(8):841–872
Nahapiet J, Ghoshal S (1998) Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. Acad
Manag Rev 23(2):242–266
Nilsson J, Hendrikse GWJ (2011) Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in Cooperatives. In: Tuunanen M et al (eds)
New development in the theory of networks, contributions to management science. Springer-Verlag,
Berlin Heidelberg, pp 339–352
Nilsson J, Kihlén A, Norell L (2009) Are traditional cooperatives an endangered species? About shrinking
satisfaction, involvement and trust. Int Food Agribusiness Manag Rev 12(4):103–123
Nilsson J, Ollila P (2009) Strategies and structures in the European dairy co-operative industry. J Co-operative
Stud 42(2):14–23
Nilsson J, Svendsen GLH, Svendsen GT (2012) Are large and complex agricultural cooperatives losing their
social capital? Agribusiness 28(2):187–204
Nooteboom B (2007) Social capital, institutions and trust. Rev Soc Econ 65:29–53
Ollila, P., Nilsson, J. and Hess, S. (2013). Member behavior within internationalized agricultural cooperatives.
Paper for the 6th international conference on economics and Management of Networks (EMNet), held at
the university Ibn Zohr, Agadir, Morocco, November 21-23, 2013
Ollila, P., Nilsson, J., and von Brömssen, C. (2011). Changing member loyalty in producer cooperatives.
Paper for the 5th international conference on economics and Management of Networks (EMNet), held in
Limassol, Cyprus, on December 1-3, 2011
W. Deng et al.
Österberg P, Nilsson J (2009) Members’ perception of their participation in the governance of cooperatives:
the key to trust and commitment in agricultural cooperatives. Agribusiness 25:181–197
Paldam M, Svendsen GT (2000) An essay on social capital: looking for the fire behind the smoke. Eur J Polit
Econ 16:339–366
Payne GT, Moore CB, Griffis SE, Autry CW (2011) Multilevel challenges and opportunities in social capital
research. J Manag 37(2):491–520
Pearson AW, Carr JC, Shaw JC (2008) Toward a theory of familiness: a social capital perspective.
Entrepreneurship Theory Pract 32(6):949–969
Peng X, Hendrikse GWJ, Deng W (2016) Communication and innovation in cooperatives. J Knowl Econ:1–
26
Pennerstorfer D, Weiss CR (2013) Product quality in the Agri-food chain: do cooperatives offer high-quality
wine? Eur Rev Agric Econ 40(1):1–20
Peterson HC, Anderson BL (1996) Cooperative strategy: theory and practice. Agribusiness 12(4):371–383
Podolny JM, Baron JN (1997) Resources and relationships: social networks and mobility in the workplace.
Am Sociol Rev 62(5):673–693
Putnam RD (1993) Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton University Press,
Princeton
Røkholt, P.O. (1999). Strengths and weaknesses of the co-operative form: a matter of perspective and opinion.
Paper presented at the ICA international research conference, Quebec, august 1999
Sabatini F (2014) Do cooperative enterprises create social trust? Small Bus Econ 42:621–641
Shaffer JD (1987) Thinking about farmers’ cooperatives, contracts, and economic coordination. ACS Service
report no. 18, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
Shapira R (1999) Loss of communal sustainability: the kibbutz shift from high-trust to low-trust culture. J
Rural Coop 27(1):55–68
Smith K, Mitchell T, Summer C (1985) Top level management priorities in different stages of the organiza-
tional life cycle. Acad Manag J 28(4):799–820
Sparrowe R, Liden R, Wayne S, Kramer M (2001) Social networks and the performance of individuals and
groups. Academic Manag J 44:316–325
Spear R (2000) The co-operative advantage. Annals Publ Cooperative Econ 71(4):507–524
Søgaard V (1994) Farmers, cooperatives, new food products. Mapp, Aarhus School of Business
Sykuta ME, Cook ML (2001) A new institutional economics approach to contracts and cooperatives. Am J
Agric Econ 83(5):1273–1279
Trechter DD, King RP, Walsh L (2002) Using communications to influence member commitment in
cooperatives. J Cooperatives 17:14–32
Tsai W, Ghoshal S (1998) Social capital and value creation: the role of intrafirm networks. Acad Manag J 41:
464–476
Uzzi BD (1996) The sources and consequences of embeddedness for economic performance of organizations.
Am Sociol Rev 61:674–698
Uzzi BD (1997) Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: the paradox of embeddedness. Adm
Sci Q 42(1):36–67
Valentinov V (2004) Toward a social capital theory of cooperative organisation. J Cooperative Stud 37(3):5–
20
Walker G, Kogut B, Shan W (1997) Social capital, structural holes, and the formation of an industry network.
Organ Sci 8(2):109–125
Wambugu, S.N., Okello, J.J. and Nyikal, R.A., (2009). Effect of social capital on performance of smallholder
producer organizations: the case of groundnut growers in Western Kenya. Contributed Paper prepared for
presentation at the International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Beijing, China,
August 16-22, 2009
Wu W (2008) Dimensions of social capital and firm competitiveness improvement: the mediating role of
information sharing. J Manag Stud 45(1):122–146
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
Internal social capital and the life cycle of agricultural...
